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Abstract
We develop a model in which two prot maximizing exchanges compete for
IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by entrepreneurs wishing to go
public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All entrepreneurs
prefer lower costs, however entrepreneurs dier in how they value a decrease
in trading costs. Hence, in equilibrium, competing exchanges obtain positive
expected prots by oering dierent execution costs and dierent listing fees.
As a result, rms that list on dierent exchanges have dierent characteristics.
The model has testable implications for the cross{sectional characteristics of
IPOs on dierent quality exchanges and the relationship between the level of
trading costs and listing fees. We also nd that competition does not guarantee
that exchanges choose welfare maximizing trading rules.
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11 Introduction
The amount of money that a rm can raise, when it initially sells o claims to a cash
ﬂow, depends on the resale value of such claims and hence on the liquidity of the
secondary market in which its shares will trade. So, there is a relationship between
the characteristics of the marketplace oered by a particular exchange and rms'
decisions to list on the exchange. In this paper, we analyze how this relationship
inﬂuences competing exchanges' choice of trading rules.
To do so, we examine three distinct, but inter{related questions about the in-
dustrial organization of stock exchanges. First, with two dierent trading systems,
how will rms trying to raise equity choose between such systems? Second, in the
longer run, does competition induce exchanges to adopt similar or dierent trading
systems and is this choice socially optimal? Finally, why do we observe such a di-
versity of trading systems? In the U.S.A., the Nasdaq is a celebrated broker/dealer
market while the NYSE employs specialists. If one market form is inherently better
at providing liquidity, why doesn't a single market type dominate? We study these
questions with a model in which:
 Prot maximizing exchanges choose (i) a per share trading cost incurred by
investors when they trade in the secondary market (that we interpret as an
outcome of trading rules/market microstructure) and (ii) set competitive listing
fees incurred by entrepreneurs who list.
 Entrepreneurs, who own productive technologies, want to sell equity shares that
are claims to the payos of these technologies. Entrepreneurs dier in the size
(value) of their companies. Each chooses (i) where to list, (ii) how many shares
to sell (what percentage ownership of the technology to cede) and (iii) the price
at which shares are initially sold to the public.
 Investors purchase shares in the Initial Public Oerings conducted by the en-
trepreneurs. These investors may be hit by liquidity shocks that force them
to liquidate their portfolios. For this reason, trading costs on the dierent
exchanges inﬂuence the prices at which IPOs take place.
We view exchanges as simple prot maximizers. Their revenues depend on listings
2in two ways. First, an exchange charges a listing fee to rms. Second, investors
incur execution costs each time they trade listed shares. In practice, both source of
revenues (trading and listing fees) are important to exchanges. In 1996, for North
American stock exchanges, listing revenues accounted for 30:9% of total revenues
whereas trading revenues accounted for 27:9% of total revenues.1 Hence, exchanges
trade{o the number of listings they can attract with their trading technology against
the listing fees they can charge. Clearly, this trade{o is resolved dierently for
dierent exchanges: listing fees on the NYSE are nearly an order of magnitude higher
than those on the Nasdaq.2
Investors, who anticipate high execution costs in the secondary market, pay less
for IPOs issued on high trading cost exchanges. Entrepreneurs take this into account
in their listing decision and thus, other things equal, prefer to list on the exchange
with the lowest trading cost. Hence, in equilibrium, a low cost exchange can charge
high fees and entrepreneurs balance better IPO prices against larger listing fees. As a
consequence, competing exchanges strategically choose dierent trading technologies
to soften competition for listings. Indeed, competing exchanges with dierent trading
costs (one with strictly larger trading costs but lower listing fees), can co{exist. The
implications are:
 Entrepreneurs with dierent characteristics choose to list on dierent exchanges.
Hence, issue size, market value, and the elasticity of demand for shares in an
IPO vary with trading cost.
 Listing fees are larger on a low trading cost exchange and the listing fee dif-
ferential between two exchanges is proportional to the dierence in execution
costs.
 Social welfare is maximized when competing exchanges choose the lowest pos-
1Source: FIBV Annual Report, 1997. Other revenue comes from additional services oered by
Stock Exchanges such as market data dissemination, clearing and settlement services etc. Note that
the revenue generated by these ancillary services is also partly proportional to the number of listings.
2The maximum initial listing fee on Nasdaq is $50;000 versus $504;600 for the NYSE. Corwin and
Harris (1998) estimate that for a rm issuing 5 million shares at $5, the initial listing fee represents
0:0375% of market value on Nasdaq against 0:1058% on the NYSE. It is also interesting to note that
the share of listing revenue and trading revenue in total revenue varies across exchanges. Angel and
Aggarwal (1996) estimate that 41% of the NYSE annual revenue in 1996 came from listing fees. For
Nasdaq, listing fees represented only 20% of total revenue in the same year.
3sible trading cost, but competition for listings between prot maximizing ex-
changes is not sucient to guarantee this. In contrast, volume maximizing
exchanges do choose the lowest trading cost market structure.
Our model of dierentiation in trading technologies can be extended to explain
minimum size requirements imposed by exchange listing standards. We show how ex-
changes optimally choose dierent minimum size requirements to soften competition
for listings. We also show that there is a limited number of possible exchanges that
can be protably created, even when the cost of setting up an exchange is very small.
There are several distinctive features of our model. First, in our framework, there
is no `clientele eect' in listing location choice and no exogenous cost to moving
between exchanges (e.g., due to national boundaries).3 Our analysis, therefore, has
relevance for situations where dierent exchanges compete for listings within the same
country (as, for example, in the U.S. or in Canada). Second, as we have mentioned,
we model exchanges as prot maximizers and consider trading rules as a variable
of choice. Third, trading costs in the secondary market aect entrepreneurs' listing
decision. In line with this feature of our model, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) nd
that the cost of capital increases with trading costs. As trading rules imply a trading
cost, their result creates a relationship between the choice of a listing location and
the rules that govern secondary market trading.4 We are aware of only one empirical
paper that examines listing choices between Nasdaq and NYSE (Corwin and Harris
(1998)).5 They nd that listing fees and execution costs do aect listing decisions.
This is a feature of our model. Further, our theoretical implications on the cross{
sectional characteristics of IPOs between two exchanges accord with their ndings.
In our model, the listing decisions' of rms are determined by exchanges' mar-
ket structures. This distinguishes the paper from extant literature in which other
3Clientele eects on both investors and rms have been oered as an explanation for the co{
existence of dierent trading technologies. See Angel and Aggarwal (1997) and Harris (1990).
4Indeed rms pay attention to trading costs in their listing decision. For instance, Cowan et al.
(1992) show that rms with larger spreads are more likely to leave Nasdaq in order to be listed on
the NYSE.
5Most of the empirical literature on listing choice has focused on the price eects when rms
delist from Nasdaq in order to list on the NYSE (Cowan et al.(1992), Grammatikos and Papaioannou
(1986), Sanger and McConnell (1986), Baker (1996)). The ndings in this empirical literature are
not relevant for the present article as we focus on rms' initial listing decisions.
4exchange characteristics determine the listing decision. For instance, Huddart et al.
(1999) consider the role of disclosure requirements. Angel and Aggarwal (1997) focus
on the sponsorship services provided by brokers/dealers, whereas Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1999) consider the certication eect of listing standards. Gehrig, Stahl
and Vives (1996) analyze the role of informational asymmetries between domestic and
foreign investors for rms listing abroad. Furthermore, in contrast to these papers,
listing fees are endogenous in our analysis and provide an incentive for exchanges to
dierentiate their trading systems.
The next section describes the model. Section 3 describes and characterizes the
outcome of the IPO process. In Section 4 we characterize the equilibrium of the
competition game between exchanges and we discuss the empirical implications in
Section 5. In Section 6, we derive the policy implications of the model. Section 7
presents an extension to dierent types of listing requirements and allows for entry
in the market for exchange services. Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are in the
Appendix and a table of our notation appears at the end of the paper (just after the
bibliography).
2 The Model
We consider an economy with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, investors and
exchanges. The timing of the game that these agents play is described in Figure 1.
There are 5 dates. At date 1, two prot maximizing exchanges choose trading rules
which generate a per share cost of trading. At date 2, they set listing fees. At date
3, each entrepreneur who owns a productive technology partially divests from his
company by going public. To do so, he chooses an exchange on which to list and sell
shares to investors in an IPO. Investors, who may have liquidity shocks, are willing
to buy shares of this technology to transfer money across time. At date 4, some of
the investors are hit by liquidity shocks and have to sell shares. At date 5, the rms'
payos are realized.
Entrepreneurs: There is a continuum of entrepreneurs, each of type t where t
is uniform on [t; t]. An entrepreneur's type is the expected per share payo from his
productive technology which will be realized at date 5. Each entrepreneur can issue
5at most N shares, therefore tN is the total size of any rm. The average expected
per share payo in the population is m. We will sometimes refer to the dispersion of
rms' expected payos, [ t − t] which we denote . Hence, t = m − 
2 and  t = m + 
2.
As all cash ﬂows are positive, m> .
Entrepreneurs derive utility from consumption at the IPO stage, date 3 (C3) and
date 5 (C5). For each entrepreneur,
U(C3;C 5)=C3 + C5; (1)
where <1 is the entrepreneur's intertemporal preference parameter. In order to
increase date 3 consumption, entrepreneurs go public and sell some of their shares or
equivalently, a percentage of ownership of the future proceeds from their productive
technology, to outside investors. Thus, entrepreneurs in our model can be thought of
as venture capitalists or original owners who want to `cash in' by selling o shares.6
Entrepreneurs maximize utility by choosing (i) whether to go public, (ii) the listing
location and (iii) the issue size and the IPO price.
Investors: A continuum of potential investors indexed by s where s is uniform
on [0;1] bid for shares in the IPOs. An investor of type s is hit by a liquidity shock
at time 4 with probability s and with probability (1−s) she is hit by a shock at time
5. At time 3, the IPO stage, each investor knows her probability (type). An investor
that is hit by a liquidity shock must liquidate her portfolio. Hence, the expected
utility7 of investor s is:
E [Us(C3;C 4;C 5)] = C3 + sEC4 +( 1− s)EC5: (2)
Each investor has sucient wealth at the IPO stage (date 3) so that she is never
wealth constrained.8 However, with no date 4 or 5 endowment she wishes to buy
shares from entrepreneurs to transfer wealth across time. She can also invest in a
6This is, indeed, one of the reason for which rms go public. See, for instance, Ellingsen and
Rydqvist (1997) or Pagano and Zingales (1998).
7Our specication of investors' preferences is similar to Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) or Bolton
and Von Thadden (1998).
8Introducing wealth constraints for investors or entrepreneurs creates technical complexities but
it does not qualitatively change our results.
6riskless asset whose rate of return, per period, is normalized to zero.9 At date 4,
investors that are hit by liquidity shocks sell o their portfolios. Trades are executed
on the exchange on which the shares are listed. For each rm, investors that are not
hit by liquidity shocks buy the shares sold at date 4 at a price, pSEC(t)=t, equal to
the rm's expected per share payo.10 Without aecting the results, we assume that
trading costs are entirely borne by sellers.
Exchanges: Exchanges are prot maximizers who derive prots from two sources:
listing fees that they charge to entrepreneurs and revenues from trading in the sec-
ondary market. There are two exchanges, Exchange 1 and Exchange 2. At date 1,
the exchanges simultaneously choose a trading technology. A trading technology is a
specic set of trading rules, the outcome of which is a per share execution cost in the
secondary market, cj;j=1 ;2.
In the market microstructure literature, dierent trading rules are associated with
dierent levels of trading costs. For simplicity, we do not explicitly model the rela-
tionship between trading rules and trading costs. Rather, we assume that exchanges
choose a trading technology associated with a trading cost or equivalently a level of
quality. There are two possible trading technologies: (i) a high cost technology, cH,
which is of low quality qL = 1
cH or (ii) a low cost technology, cL which is of high
quality qH = 1
cL.
The trading cost is not necessarily a trading fee. That is, costs faced by investors
are not necessarily completely recovered by the exchanges. We denote by γ  0 the
fraction of the total trading cost cj that is recovered by an exchange.
A value of γ less than 1 can be interpreted in two ways. First, the market mi-
crostructure literature is replete with examples in which there are sources of execution
costs that are partially controlled by the exchange (through the design of its trading
rules) but that do not directly generate revenues for the exchange. For example, con-
sider the minimum price variation (tick size). Tick size is chosen by an exchange and
9We assume that the entrepreneurs cannot short sell the riskless asset. Otherwise, the dierence
in intertemporal preference parameters between entrepreneurs and investors precludes the existence
of an equilibrium in the market for the riskless asset since all the agents are risk neutral.
10Bertrand competition among the buyers insures that this price is indeed the equilibrium price in
the secondary market. Note that the entrepreneurs have no utility for consumption at date 4. Thus
they do not sell or short-sell shares at this date. If the entrepreneurs could consume at date 4, the
equilibrium in the secondary market would exist only if we assume that short sales are forbidden.
7creates a wedge between the fair value of the asset and the price at which investors
can buy or sell the asset. This wedge is a transaction cost but is not recovered by the
exchange. Rather, it allows liquidity suppliers (e.g. limit order traders or dealers) to
capture rents.11 Second, a fraction of the order ﬂow may be routed away from the
exchange on which a rm has listed. This will result in a lower γ for the exchange.12
At date 2, exchanges simultaneously set a listing fee,13 Fj, that must be paid by
a rm if it lists on the exchange. In sum, an exchange, say j, is characterized by
(cj;F j), i.e., a specic bundle of trading cost and listing fee.
Let Tj  [t; t] be the subset of entrepreneurs who list on Exchange j. Let Vo l(t;qj)
be the expected trading volume in the secondary market for the shares issued by an
entrepreneur of type t. We normalize the marginal cost of an additional listing to
zero. Therefore, the total expected prot of Exchange j is:
j(Tj)=Fj Pr[t 2T j]+γcjE [Vo l(t;qj) j t 2T j]: (3)
A listing generates two types of revenue for the exchange. First, the exchange
obtains the listing fee. Second, the exchange obtains revenue proportional to the
trading volume in this listing. Exchange j chooses (cj;F j) to maximize its total
expected prot.
3 The Initial Public Oering Process
Consider an entrepreneur who has decided to go public on Exchange j. We derive
the number of shares that are sold by the entrepreneur in the IPO (the `issue size')
and the price at which he sells these shares (`the IPO price'). Then, we compute the
11Subrahmanyam and Chordia (1995) provide a model in which the minimum price variation
enables dealers to capture strictly positive expected prots at the expense of liquidity demanders.
Madhavan (1992) compares trading costs (due to asymmetric information) in two markets with
dierent trading rules: an order-driven market and a quote-driven market. He shows that trading
costs dier in these two trading mechanisms. This illustrates that an exchange can control execution
costs, even when these costs do not directly accrue to the exchange.
12For instance, in the U.S., shares listed on the NYSE are traded on regional exchanges and OTC.
Empirically, the original listing location retains the lion's share of trading, however. Hasbrouck
(1995) reports that for the Dow 30 stocks, the NYSE executes on average 84:5% of the daily volume.
13Exchanges charge two types of listing fees. An entry fee that is paid up-front when the rm
initially lists and a continuation fee that is paid annually. For our model, this distinction is not
relevant.
8utility benet to the entrepreneur from going public and we relate it to the liquidity
of the exchange.
Our model of price formation in the IPO is a stylized rendering of a book building.
First, investors truthfully report their valuation for the issue. After observing the
schedule of bids, the entrepreneur decides what fraction, (1 − ), of his N shares he
will sell. Given the investors' demand, this determines an IPO price. All investors
with a valuation greater than or equal to the IPO price get an equal number, Nds,
of shares.14 The entrepreneur retains the residual.
Let V (s;t;cj) be the per share valuation of an investor with type s, for a rm
with an expected payo t, that is listed on Exchange j. This is the maximum that
such an investor will bid in the IPO. It is immediate that:
V (s;t;cj)=t − scj; (4)
the expected payo per share minus the investor's expected trading cost. Thus,
investors' required rate of return increases with the size of the trading cost.15
The higher the probability of a shock, the larger the expected trading costs faced
by an investor in the secondary market, hence, the less she is willing to pay for the
stock. Therefore, V (s;t;cj) decreases with the probability of a liquidity shock, s. So,
that if an investor of type s buys in the IPO, then all investor types with s<s 
participate as well. Hence, if the entrepreneur wants to sell a fraction (1−)o fh i sN
shares then the investor who is indierent between buying and not, s, is such that:
Z s
0
Nds=[ 1− ]N: (5)
Clearly, s =( 1− ). To sell (1 − )N shares, the IPO price16 must be equal to
14The specic allocation rule we consider enables us to get closed form solutions for the equilibrium.
The crucial assumption is that no investor can buy more than a small fraction of all the shares
in a given issue. This could be because investors choose to be well diversied or, alternatively,
entrepreneurs want to tap the wealth of dierent classes of investors (institutional investors, small
investors) to avoid any large stake being assembled by a single investor (Brennan and Franks (1997)).
15In the model, as investors are risk-neutral, their required return is independent of the size of
their stake.
16The IPO outcome can be implemented with a uniform price auction in which (i) the entrepreneur
announces the size of the issue, (ii) investors post bids for a xed quantity, (ii) the IPO price is chosen
so as to equate supply and demand and (iii) all the orders from investors with a bid larger than or
equal to the IPO price are lled. As there is a continuum of investors, it is optimal for each investor
to post a bid equal to her valuation.
9the valuation of the marginal investor of type s. Thus,
Lemma 1 : The inverse demand curve faced by an entrepreneur of type t who lists
on exchange j is
p
IPO(;t;cj)=V (s
;t;c j)=t − cj(1 − ): (6)
Figure 2 depicts this function for dierent levels of trading costs in the secondary
market. Observe that the IPO price is decreasing in the number of shares, (1−)N,
that the entrepreneur sells. So, the demand for IPOs is not perfectly elastic. In
our model, this is because the larger the number of shares the entrepreneur sells,
the larger the set of investors the entrepreneur must tap into. Hence, the marginal
investor in the IPO has a higher probability of a liquidity shock and consequently a
lower valuation for the shares.
Let U(;t;cj) be the increase in the expected utility (gross of the listing fee) of
the entrepreneur who goes public on Exchange j and who retains a proportion  of
all the shares. This is made up of two parts: rst the IPO proceeds and second the
loss in future cash ﬂows from having sold shares. Or,
U(;t;cj)=N(1 − )p
IPO(;t;cj) − (1 − )Nt (7)
=( 1 − )N(1 − )t − (1 − )
2Ncj; (8)
where the last line follows from the IPO price (Equation (6)).
Trade occurs at the IPO stage because each entrepreneur has a smaller valuation
for a unit of future consumption than each investor. The former value future con-
sumption at  and the latter at 1. Accordingly, the benet from going public (the rst
term of Equation (8)) increases in (1 − ), the size of the gains from trade between
investors and entrepreneurs. If the secondary market were perfectly liquid (cj = 0),
it would be optimal for the entrepreneur to sell an arbitrarily large number of shares
because the dierence in valuation between the entrepreneur and the public is inde-
pendent of each investors' stake. When the secondary market is illiquid (cj > 0),
as the entrepreneur issues more shares, the valuation of the marginal buyer in the
IPO decreases. As a consequence, the number of shares that the entrepreneur sells
10is bounded. Thus, the trading cost is a source of ineciency since it prevents gains
from trade between investors and entrepreneurs at the IPO stage.
The entrepreneur's optimal retained stake, , maximizes his expected utility from
going public. The solution to this problem determines the IPO price and the issue
size.
Lemma 2 (IPO price and Issue Size): An entrepreneur of type t that lists on






at a price pIPO =
(1+)t






Given the number of shares an entrepreneur of type t will optimally issue if he
lists on Exchange j and the probability that his shareholders will be hit by liquidity
shocks, we can determine the expected trading volume in the secondary market.17
Lemma 3 : The expected trading volume in the secondary market of entrepreneur





Thus, the expected trading volume increases with the quality of the exchange
on which a rm lists (or equivalently decreases with the per share trading cost paid
by investors) and increases with the size of the rm, t. Hence, given entrepreneurs'
decision in IPOs and Tj, the set of rms who list on Exchange j, the expected prot
of the exchange is just:




j t 2T j
#
: (12)
17The optimal number of retained shares (t;qj) is strictly positive if qj is suciently small (the
trading cost suciently large). For our results, we only require that the number of retained shares
be bounded, which is guaranteed for any positive trading cost. In practice <0 can be interpreted
as a short sale in the IPO by the issuer.
11An exchange's trading cost does not directly enter the prot function. This is
because if the trading cost per share increases, entrepreneurs optimally issue fewer
shares which implies that expected trading volume decreases. So, the trading revenue
is unchanged. However, trading costs are important to an exchange's revenue because
they aect the entrepreneurs' listing decisions and hence the set Tj.
4 Competition for Listings and the choice of Trad-
ing Technologies.
In this section, we show that it can be optimal for exchanges to choose dierent
technologies. To analyze this, we rst take trading technologies as given and look at
the listing fee sub{game in the two possible cases that can arise in equilibrium: either
both exchanges choose the same technology or both exchanges choose a dierent
technology. In the second case, we establish conditions under which the high cost
(low quality) exchange attracts listings in equilibrium. In subsection 4.3 we use these
results to establish that it can be optimal for two exchanges to choose dierent trading
technologies. To simplify computations, we x  =1 =2. This assumption does not
qualitatively aect results since the parameter  just determines the size of the gains
from trade between investors and entrepreneurs. In fact, all our results are robust for
all parameterizations for which there are gains from trade, or <1.
For a given pair of listing fees (Fj;F0
j), an entrepreneur of type t lists on Exchange
j if this gives him the highest maximal utility benet of going public net of listing
fees or if:
U(




The \max" reﬂects the fact that if Fj  U((t;qj);t), the listing fee is larger
than his maximal utility benet, and the entrepreneur prefers not to go public. If
an entrepreneur does go public, using the maximal utility benet from going public
(Equation (10)), Equation (13) becomes
N[qj − qj0]t2
16
>F j − F
0
j: (14)
12Thus, entrepreneurs face a trade{o between the quality and the listing fee of
an exchange. To understand this trade{o, consider the maximal utility benet of
going public, U((t;qj);t). Three of its properties are crucial for our analysis of
competition between exchanges.
Lemma 4 : The maximal utility benet of going public on Exchange j, U((t;qj);t),









Observe that all rms prefer lower trading costs, but larger rms benet more
for a given improvement in exchange quality. The entrepreneurs of these rms are
more sensitive to the size of the trading cost since they sell more shares to the public.
Thus, they are willing to pay larger listing fees for a better trading technology. For
this reason, in equilibrium, rms that list on exchanges with dierent execution costs
(dierent qualities) have dierent characteristics, as shown in Section 5.
4.1 A Benchmark: Competition for Listings with Identical
Trading Technologies.
If the two exchanges have the same technology, (qj = qj0), Equation (14) becomes
Fj <F j0:
Thus, all rms list on the exchange with the lowest listing fee. If the fees are
equal, we assume that rms randomize between exchanges with probability 1/2. En-
trepreneurs can also choose not to list, so we consider a fee less than the maximum util-
ity benet to entrepreneurs or F  U((t;q j);t). At such a fee, all entrepreneurs
are willing to go public. Using Equation (12) and the randomization rule, the prot














8 if Fj = F<F 0
j;
0 otherwise.
Undercutting is protable as long as F>−
Nγm
8 . Thus, in equilibrium both
exchanges choose a listing fee equal to F  = −
Nγm
8 and obtain zero expected prot,
just as in the traditional model of Betrand price competition. If γ>0, then exchanges
derive some revenue from the trading costs and the listing fee is a subsidy. As trading
in the secondary market generates revenue for them, they are willing to subsidize
rms that go public since listings are necessary to create trading volume.
Proposition 1 : If two exchanges competing in listing fees have the same trading
technology so that q1 = q2 then (1) all entrepreneurs go public and (2) each exchange
makes zero expected prots.
Observe that in this case, as rms randomize between the exchanges, the cross-
sectional characteristics of rms on either exchange are the same.
4.2 Competition for Listings With Dierent Trading Tech-
nologies.
Suppose now that the two exchanges have dierent trading technologies, so that
trading costs are dierent between the two markets. We assign index 1 to the low
trading cost (high quality) exchange (i.e. c1 = cL so that q1 = qH =1 =cL and
c2 = cH so that q2 = qL =1 =cH). We denote the dierence in quality between the
two exchanges by q = q1 − q2, and the dierence in listing fees by F = F1 − F2.
As all entrepreneurs prefer low cost (high quality) exchanges (Lemma 4), for the
high cost (low quality) exchange to attract any listings, it must charge lower listing
fees, or F2 <F 1. In this case, entrepreneurs trade{o a larger utility benet, gross of
the listing fee, if they go public on the high quality (low cost) exchange against the
higher listing fee charged by this exchange. If the dierence in listing fees between
the exchanges is suciently large relative to the dierence in quality, some rms
will choose to list on the low quality exchange. From Lemma 4 we know that large
rms are more willing to pay for increases in exchange quality than small rms. This
property naturally leads to a sorting condition on rms who do go public.
14Lemma 5 : Consider two exchanges: if q1 >q 2 and F1 >F 2, then there exists a rm
type tc, such that for t>t c, the entrepreneur prefers to list on the high quality (low
cost) Exchange 1 and for t  tc, the entrepreneur prefers to list on the low quality







Thus, t(F1;F 2) is the entrepreneur type who is indierent between listing on the
low quality exchange and the high quality (low cost) exchange. If this type is larger
than the smallest rm size (t >t ), then both exchanges will have a positive market
share.
From Equation (15), both the listing fee and the quality of an exchange are impor-
tant determinants of the choice of a listing location by a rm and hence the market
share of an exchange. This feature of our model is consistent with Corwin and Har-
ris (1998) who nd that dierences in listing costs and execution costs between the
NYSE and Nasdaq are important factors in the initial listing decision of rms.
To give a clearer indication of the game, we dene the prot functions of the two
exchanges and the possible equilibria which can obtain in the listing fee sub{game.
To describe the prot functions, we rst calculate the listing fees for which each rm
captures the whole market (`exclusionary' fee) and the fees for which each rm gets
no listings at all (the `opt out' fee).
Let F min
j (F 0
j) be the exclusionary fee for Exchange j when its competitor chooses
a fee equal to F 0
j. Recall, from Lemma 5 that Exchange 1's market share is [t; t],
whereas Exchange 2's market share is [t;t ). So, the exclusionary fee for Exchange 1
is the one so that t =tor Exchange 2's market share is zero. For Exchange 2 the
exclusionary fee is one such that t =  t or Exchange 1's market share is zero. From













For each exchange there is also a listing fee (the `opt out fee') such that the
exchange attracts no listings at all, for a given listing fee of its competitor. Let
F max
j (F 0











































where e t = max[t;4
q
F2
Nq2]. The entrepreneur with type e t is just indierent between
listing on Exchange 2 or not going public.
Using the prot functions, we can determine the reaction functions of each ex-
change. To do so, let F int
j be the listing fee for Exchange j that maximizes prots on
(F min
j ;Fmax
j ) and let int





















j ] < 0;
F int
j otherwise.
In the two rst cases, the optimal response of Exchange j is a corner solution of
its maximization problem, whereas in the last case it is an interior solution. A pair
of listing fees (F 
1;F
2) is a Nash equilibrium i F 
1 = F r
1(F 
2) and F 
2 = F r
2(F 
1).
In what follows we focus on pure strategy equilibria in the listing fee game. A
sucient condition for existence of such equilibria is that 2(q)t  γ. We will always
assume that this is the case.18
18Suppose that this condition is violated, so that γ is very large. Then, each exchange garners a
large revenue from each transaction. Each therefore, has an incentive to undercut in listing fees to
get extra listings. If the quality dierential is small relative to this revenue gain, this eect prevents
16Recall, that Exchange 1 is of high quality (low cost). It is intuitive, therefore that
in equilibrium, it will never be driven out of the market. Further, observe that if
Exchange 1 is the only exchange serving the market, then all entrepreneurs go public.
To see this, recall that the maximal utility benet to an entrepreneur of going public
is always positive. So, if there is an equilibrium in which only Exchange 1 serves the
market and some entrepreneurs do not go public then Exchange 2 can oer a positive
listing fee, attract the unserved entrepreneurs and make prots. Hence:
Lemma 6 :
1. There is no equilibrium in which Exchange 1 does not attract listings.
2. In equilibrium, if only Exchange 1 attracts listings then all rms go public.
3. The equilibrium listing fees are either (F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) (both exchanges attract list-
ings) or (F min
1 ;Fmax
2 ) (only Exchange 1 attracts listings and it attracts all the
listings).
Is the exclusionary pricing policy (F1 = F min
1 ) always optimal for Exchange 1? or
are there conditions under which a low quality (high cost) exchange has a positive
market share in equilibrium? Indeed, the high quality (low cost) exchange might
be better o charging a larger fee that only attracts entrepreneurs with the highest
willingness to pay. Such a cream{skimming policy leaves some room for the low
quality Exchange 2, which can then charge a listing fee that attracts the remaining
entrepreneurs. This policy turns out to be optimal for Exchange 1 if the dispersion
of entrepreneur types is suciently large or if > c, where c  2m
5 .
Proposition 2 : Consider an economy with two exchanges in which the quality dif-
ferential is strictly positive (q>0). If the dispersion of entrepreneur types is
suciently large so that > c then both exchanges attract listings in equilibrium.
Listings are split between the two exchanges if the dispersion of rm size is su-
ciently large. In this case, the low trading cost exchange is better o specializing in
the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Technical details of this condition appear in Lemma 8
in the appendix.
17relatively large rms rather than choosing a very low fee that would prevent Exchange
2 from attracting any listings. Note, that the proposition holds even if γ =0 ,i.e.,
if exchanges do not capture any revenue from trading in the secondary market. This
cream{skimming policy, when the dispersion of rms sizes becomes suciently small,
is suboptimal for Exchange 1, as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 : Consider an economy with two exchanges in which the quality dif-
ferential is strictly positive (q>0) . If the dispersion of entrepreneurs is suciently
small so that   c then in equilibrium the high quality (low cost) Exchange 1 attracts
all the listings.
It is natural to relate the dispersion of rm types to the size of the economy.
If the economy is suciently large, that is if > c, then two dierent exchanges
is the natural outcome of competition in listings. If, by contrast,  is suciently
small, then the exchange with the highest quality serves as a natural monopoly. This
suggests that as economies grow, we should expect more exchanges with dierent
trading technologies. This intuition is further explored in Section 7.2.
Alternatively, one can interpret the dispersion of entrepreneur types as a function
of the outside opportunities for raising capital. If there are few opportunities outside
equity markets for raising capital, that is if  is large, then we predict dierentiated
equity markets. If, however, there are many and well{developed avenues for raising
funds, so that  is small in the economy, then we predict an equilibrium with a single
exchange.
4.3 Long Term Competition in Trading Technologies.
Given the previous subsections, it is natural to ask: if exchanges choose their trading
technology, what technologies will they choose? That is, will exchanges choose to
dierentiate? Will one of them optimally choose a low quality (high cost)? This
question is pertinent for regulators who are concerned with the optimal industrial
organization of stock exchanges.
First, observe that the ex ante prots of rms in the dierent equilibria can be
explicitly ranked. Dene L to be the expected prot of the low quality (high cost)
18exchange and H to be the expected prot of the high quality (low cost) exchange.
Then,
Proposition 4 : Consider an economy with two exchanges who have chosen dierent
trading technologies:
1. If > c so that both exchanges attract listings then both exchanges make strictly
positive expected prots and the prot of the high quality (low cost) exchange is
higher than the prot of the low quality (high cost) exchange. Or,
H > L > 0:
2. If   c then only the high quality (low cost) exchange attracts listings. Or,
H > L =0 :
When the exchanges choose the same trading technology, they get a zero expected
prot (Proposition 1). Table 1 below is the matrix of exchanges' expected prots as
a function of their trading technology choices at date 1. Exchange j is the row player





Clearly, there are two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, if > c. Either Ex-
change j chooses the low trading cost technology and Exchange j0 chooses the high
trading cost technology or vice versa.19 If, however,   c,i ti saweakly domi-
nant strategy for both exchanges to choose the low trading cost technology (because
L = 0). The next proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 5 : In an economy in which two exchanges can choose their trading
technology:
19There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each exchange chooses the high trading cost
technology with probability  = H
L+H .
191. If > c then the outcome of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is that each
exchange chooses a dierent technology.
2. If   c then there is a unique weakly dominant Nash equilibrium in which
both exchanges choose the high quality (low cost) technology.
This proposition establishes that it can be optimal for an exchange not to provide
a trading technology that guarantees the lowest execution costs in the secondary
market.20 An exchange which dierentiates itself softens price competition in listings.
Therefore, the benet to an exchange of a large trading cost is strategic in our model: it
enables an exchange to earn positive prots. By contrast, if both exchanges choose the
same trading technology, they dier only by listing fees. Hence, Bertrand competition
drives expected prots to zero.
5 Testable Implications.
We have established a condition (> c) under which two exchanges competing
for listings in an economy will choose dierent trading technologies and both have
positive market shares. In this case, our model has testable implications for IPOs on
competing exchanges and the relationship between trading costs and listing fees on
these exchanges.
5.1 Implications for IPOs
We have noted that exchanges should attract listings from rms with dierent sizes.
Hence, rm characteristics (issue size, proceeds, market value) of IPOs' on two ex-
changes with dierent execution costs under the same jurisdiction should dier in a
systematic way. In particular:
Corollary 1 : In any economy in which two exchanges with dierent trading tech-
nologies compete for listings, the expected proportion of original shares oered to the
20This is socially inecient. We discuss social optimality in Section 6.
20public is larger for an IPO taking place on the high quality (low cost) Exchange 1 than
for an IPO taking place on the low quality (high cost) Exchange 2, or
E[(1 − 
(t;q1)) j Lists on Exchange 1] >E [(1 − 
(t;q2)) j Lists on Exchange 2]:
This suggests that the post IPO ownership structure of rms who list on the low
cost (high quality) exchange should be less concentrated than for rms that list on
the high cost (low quality) exchange.
Corollary 2 : In any economy in which two exchanges with dierent trading tech-
nologies compete for listings:
1. The expected proceeds for an IPO taking place on the high quality (low cost)
Exchange 1 are larger than for an IPO taking place on the low quality (high
cost) Exchange 2, or
E[(1 − 
(t;q1))Np
IPO j Lists on Exchange 1]
>E [(1 − 
(t;q2))Np
IPO j Lists on Exchange 2]:
2. The expected market value of a rm listed on the high quality (low cost) Exchange
1 is larger than for a rm listed on the low quality (high cost) Exchange 2, or
E[(1 − 
(t;q1))Np
SEC j Lists on Exchange 1]
>E [(1 − 
(t;q2))Np
SEC j Lists on Exchange 2]:
Of course, if trading costs are identical for the two exchanges, our model does not
predict cross{sectional dierences. In the U.S. it is well-documented that execution
costs are larger on Nasdaq (see for instance Huang and Stoll (1996)). Corwin and
Harris (1998) study initial listing choices for a sample of rms that conducted Initial
Public Oerings between 1991 and 1996, either on the NYSE and the Nasdaq. They
restrict their attention to rms that are eligible to list on both exchanges. They
document substantial dierences between the IPOs that take place on the NYSE and
Nasdaq. In particular they nd (Table 3, page 30) that the number of oered shares,
the oer proceeds and the post IPO market value of rms that list on the NYSE are
signicantly larger than on Nasdaq. These ndings are consistent with our corollaries.
21Corollary 3 : In any economy in which two exchanges with dierent trading tech-
nologies compete for listings, the inverse demand curve for IPOs is steeper for the







Kandel et al. (1999) show empirically that the demand for shares in IPOs' is not
perfectly elastic. Our corollary further suggests that (1) execution costs should be
a main determinant of the elasticity of the demand for shares in IPO and (2) that
this elasticity should dier systematically between exchanges with dierent execution
costs. Corollary 3 could be tested using the schedule of bids (the book) for IPOs
taking place on Nasdaq and NYSE.
5.2 Implications on Listing Fees
A further set of predictions exists on the listing fees. First, according to the model,
listing fees on the high quality (low cost) exchange must be greater than listing fees
on the low quality (high cost) exchange. This property is consistent with stylized
facts. In the U.S., empirical studies nd that Nasdaq has higher execution costs than
the NYSE. At the same time, listing fees (in absolute terms and as a percentage of
market capitalization) are much higher on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq (see Corwin
and Harris (1998)).
To generate further predictions, we provide explicit closed form solutions for listing
fees when each exchange has positive market share (> c), and all rms go public.
In the model, competition will generate fees low enough so that all rms go public
if the percentage dierence in execution costs, a =
cH−cL
cH , is less than 33% (this is
a sucient condition). Intuitively, if the dierence in trading costs is small, then
competition in listing fees is heightened. Hence, the fee of the high cost (low quality)
exchange is suciently low so that even the smallest entrepreneur nds it worthwhile
to go public. Until the end of this section, we therefore assume that a  33%.
Proposition 6 : In an economy in which two exchanges attract listings (> c),
and the percentage dierence in trade execution costs is suciently small, (a  1
3),
22the equilibrium listing fees are:
F





























The following corollaries analyze the impact of a change in exogenous parameters
on the listing fees given in the previous proposition.
Corollary 4 : Dierences in quality soften price competition so that the listing fee










If exchanges compete by changing their trading system so that the quality dieren-
tial decreases, then there should be a corresponding decrease in listing fees. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that in recent years, the gap between NYSE and Nasdaq trading
costs has declined. In line with our prediction, the NYSE has responded by capping
listing fees. Note that for unilateral changes in exchange quality, the eect on listing
fees depends on which exchange is changing its execution cost. If the high quality
(low cost) exchange decreases its trading cost then the quality dierential increases.
In contrast, if the low quality (high cost) exchange decreases its trading cost then the
quality dierential decreases. Therefore, if Nasdaq decreases execution costs, listing
fees should fall, but if the NYSE decreases execution costs, then listing fees should
rise.












Note that q is proportional to the percentage dierence in execution costs. Thus,
the dierence in listing fees should increase when the dierence in execution costs
increases.21
Corollary 6 : The higher the revenues from trading volume, the lower the listing fee









For each exchange, the opportunity cost of losing one listing, which includes the
loss of trading fees generated by this listing, increases as γ increases. It follows that
exchanges compete more aggressively for listings. As in the benchmark case, the two
exchanges can even oer subsidies (negative listing fees) if γ>0. Interestingly, this
corollary suggests that the existence of third parties competing for order ﬂow (so
that γ is lower) may be a way for exchanges to credibly commit to charging high
listing fees, whereas a movement to recover trading costs for an exchange signals a
willingness to compete aggressively on listing fees. In the U.S., regional exchanges
and Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) such as Instinet, capture part of the
order ﬂow in shares listed on exchanges. We predict that an increase in the fraction
of the order ﬂow in listed shares captured by these trading venues could lead to an
increase in listing fees charged by NYSE and Nasdaq.
21Execution costs depend both on trading organization and on rms' characteristics. Our model
and its implications focus on the component of execution cost, which is exchange specic. One way
to estimate this component is to measure total trading costs for matched samples of rms listed
on dierent exchanges. The dierence between the average trading costs for these samples can be
ascribed to structural dierences in the organization of the exchanges and can be used as a proxy
for (cH −cL) in our model. This is the method used in Huang and Stoll (1996) or Aeck-Graves et
al. (1994) for instance.
246 Policy Implications and Regulation.
Should Stock Exchanges be allowed to choose their own trading rules? Recently, this
issue has attracted considerable attention (see, for instance, Mahoney (1997), Kahan
(1997) or Macey and O'Hara (1997)). One argument in favor of self regulation is
that competition for listings should lead exchanges to choose trading rules that are
socially desirable. For instance, Mahoney (1997) claims that:
\The necessity of attracting investors who have ample alternatives should
lead exchanges to choose rules and listing standards that produce benets
to investors [...]. Self-interested Stock Exchange members will produce
rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested bakers
produce the kind of bread that consumers want."[Mahoney (1997), p1459]
Our measure of social welfare is the total surplus, (q1;q 2): the sum of total in-
vestors' surplus, I(q1;q 2), total entrepreneurs' surplus, E(q1;q 2), and total exchange
surplus, 1 + 2.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that γ = 1 but our results do not
depend on this assumption. When γ = 1, there are no transfers to third parties.
Hence, exchange prots are transfers from the entrepreneurs and investors. Further,
when computing social surplus, we restrict attention to parameter values so that in
equilibrium all the rms go public (i.e. a  1
3) and both exchanges are active (> c).
We indicate why this is innocuous below. Computations yield the following closed
form expression for total social welfare.
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Inspection of the previous equation, immediately yields the following proposition.
Proposition 7 : Social welfare is maximized when both exchanges choose the high
quality (low cost) technology, so that q =0 .
25Distortions in this economy arise when an exchange optimally chooses to adopt
a high trading cost (low quality), so that q>0. Gains from trade between en-
trepreneurs and investors are then lower because the entrepreneurs who choose to list
on the low quality (high cost) exchange issue fewer shares. Note, that if some rms
do not go public (a>1=3), the ineciency is even stronger. An implication of this
is that:
Corollary 7 : If the dispersion of rm types in the economy is suciently large,
(> c), then competition for listings between prot maximizing exchanges does not
maximize social welfare.
Hence, competition between prot maximizing exchanges does not necessarily lead
to socially ecient trading rules. Exchanges choose ecient trading rules, however
if they choose their trading technology to maximize expected trading volume, under
the constraint that they obtain a positive expected prot.22
Proposition 8 : If exchanges seek to maximize expected trading volume (instead of
prot maximization), they both choose the low trading cost (high quality) technology
and therefore social welfare is maximized .
Our two last results show that the eciency of exchanges' trading rules depends
on their objective function and therefore on their governance structure. Intuitively,
if security issuers owned or controlled exchanges, then they would be interested in
maximizing the gains from trade (with investors) and would therefore choose a volume
maximizing rule. This observation vindicates Amihud and Mendelson (1996)'s claim
that the issuer should have a voice in decisions aecting the way its securities are
traded. Recently many stock exchanges have been incorporated and thus became for-
prot organizations.23 Our result suggests that a private, prot maximizing exchange
22Huddart et al. (1999) consider the choice of disclosure requirements, in a Kyle (1985) model,
by two Stock Exchanges competing for trading volume. The choice of a disclosure requirement in
their model is similar to the choice of a trading technology in our model. Huddart et al.(1998) show
that competition between exchanges results in a \race for the top" in the sense that both exchanges
choose the highest possible disclosure requirement. Their analysis oers some support for the view
that the choice of trading rules should be delegated to exchanges. We concur if exchanges are volume
maximizers.
23For instance the Australian, the Swedish and the Dutch Stock Exchanges. In the U.S., Nasdaq
is considering issuing shares privately in the coming year.
26with dispersed ownership may choose trading rules that are less socially desirable
than a mutual, volume maximizing exchange.
To sum up, the results of this section show that self-regulation for a prot max-
imizing exchange does not necessarily yield a socially ecient trading organization,
even in a competitive environment.
7 Extensions.
In this section, we present two extensions of our model of competition for listings.
First, we show that our model can explain why exchanges voluntarily limit their
market shares by setting minimum size requirements. Then, we consider entry in the
exchange services market. We show that there is a natural limit on the number of
exchanges, independent of the magnitude of entry costs.
7.1 Minimum Size Requirements
Listed rms must meet listing requirements chosen by exchanges. For instance, rms
must have an aggregate market value and a net income in excess of a pre{specied
threshold. As for trading technologies, competing exchanges do not in general choose
identical listing requirements. But why would an exchange impose listing require-
ments that are more stringent than a competitor's listing requirements? Or, why
would an exchange deliberately choose to restrict its market share? Our purpose is to
show that, as for trading technologies, exchanges have an incentive to choose dierent
size requirements in order to soften competition. To quickly convey the intuition, we
consider the following simple game that we call the listing requirements game.I n
this game, exchanges have the same trading cost, but each exchange can require a
minimum size for listed rms.
To formalize the notion of a minimum size requirement, let tmin
j be the minimum
size requirement of Exchange j, meaning that only rms with an expected payo
larger than tmin
j can list on Exchange j. Suppose that the two exchanges have the
same trading technology (q1 = q2) and suppose that at date 1, they can choose between
two minimum size requirements: soft in which case tmin
j = t or tough in which case
27tmin
j = tT >t . Let Exchange 1 be the exchange with a tough listing policy. Suppose
that Exchange 1 chooses its listing fee rst.24 If the two exchanges have the same
listing policy, one exchange is randomly selected to choose its listing fee rst. Then,
Proposition 9 : Consider the listing requirements game at the stage in which ex-
changes choose their listing fees (date 2). In equilibrium:
 If the two exchanges have dierent minimum size requirements, both exchanges
earn strictly positive prots. Further, Exchange 1 and Exchange 2 charge listing
fees so that they attract respectively rms with sizes in [tT; t] and [t;t T].
 If the two exchanges have the same minimum size requirement, both exchanges
charge listing fees so that they obtain zero expected prots.
The intuition is as follows. If the two exchanges have the same minimum size
requirement, they end up competing  a la Bertrand for listings which leaves no room
for prots. By contrast, if they have dierent minimum size requirements, Exchange 2
(with the low listing requirement) has monopoly power on all the entrepreneurs with
an expected payo in [t;t T). This exchange can attract all the rms with a fee which
is slightly lower than the fee of Exchange 1 but is better o charging the monopoly
fee for the entrepreneurs that are not eligible to list on Exchange 1. Exchange 1
chooses a listing fee suciently small so that (i) it attracts all the entrepreneurs with
type larger than tT and (ii) Exchange 2 has no incentive to attract some of these


















24When the two exchanges have dierent minimum size requirements, there is no equilibrium in
pure strategy, in the listing fee stage, if the exchanges determine their fees simultaneously. Thus,
for simplicity, we assume that exchanges choose their fees in sequence. The results in this section
do not qualitatively depend on the sequence of moves.
28where m
2 is the expected prot of Exchange 2 when it chooses to charge the monopoly
fee for rms in [t;t T]. Using the reasoning of Proposition 5, we can show that the stage
in which exchanges choose their minimum size requirement has two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies. In both equilibria, exchanges choose dierent size requirements since
this is a way to split the market and to guarantee strictly positive expected prots.
Therefore:
Proposition 10 : In equilibrium, the two exchanges choose dierent minimum size
requirements.
We have considered the level of the tough minimum size requirement (tT)a s
given. Note that the expected prot (m
2 ) obtained by Exchange 2 must increase
with this level. It follows (using Equation (18)) that F 
1 also increases with tT. Thus,
in choosing the minimum size requirement, Exchange 1 faces a trade o between
the level of its listing fee and the size of its market share (which decreases with the
toughness of its minimum size requirement). For values of tT close to t, Exchange 1's
expected prot is strictly increasing with the level of its minimum size requirement.
Consequently, if Exchange 1 could optimally pick this level, it would choose it in such
a way that Exchange 2's market share is not too small, i.e., in such a way that tT is
not too close to t.
To sum up, we have shown in this section that minimum size requirements arise
naturally as a way to soften price competition for listings and to sustain strictly
positive expected prots.25
7.2 Determinants of the Number of Exchanges.
So far, we have taken the number of rms in the economy as given. Now we consider
the possibility of entry in the market for exchange services. Is there a natural bound
on the number of exchanges and does the threat of entry drive exchanges to choose
the low cost technology?
25Of course, another possible explanation for minimum size requirements is that they act as a
screening device, which help exchanges in their certication role (which is beyond the scope of the
present paper).
29To address these questions we extend the game. At date 0, a large pool of potential
exchanges decide to enter the market for exchange services. On entry they incur a
xed entry cost, . After the entry stage, the game proceeds as before.
Proposition 11 : For all >0, when there are only two trading technologies:
1. If   c, then at most one exchange is formed.
2. If > c, then at most two exchanges are formed and choose dierent trading
technologies (q1 and q2).
These results hold for all xed costs, even arbitrarily small ones. They are driven
by the fact that exchanges make positive prots if they dierentiate. If they do not
dierentiate, they obtain zero prots and cannot recover the xed cost of entry. If
  c, we have shown (Proposition 3) that only the exchange with the highest
quality attracts listings. Exchanges, therefore pool on the highest quality which
would drive prots to zero (Proposition 5). Thus, only one exchange enters.26 If
> c, the market is large enough for two exchanges to enter and earn positive
prots (Proposition 4). They can therefore recover a (suciently low) xed cost.
Another exchange entering the market cannot dierentiate (given that there are two
trading technologies). Therefore, it would Bertrand compete with one of the existing
exchanges, earn zero prots and would not be able to recover the cost of entry.
Thus, the number of dierent trading technologies puts a natural bound on the
number of exchanges. The rst part of the previous result also suggests that the
number of exchanges is also limited by the size of the economy, . In order to
show this more formally, we consider a large number (N  2) of dierent trading







Proposition 12 : For all >0 and for all n 2 [2;N],i f  c(n) then at most
(n − 1) exchanges are formed. All the exchanges that are formed choose dierent
trading technologies, namely q1, q2,...,qn−1.
Note that c(2) = 2m
5 . Thus, when   2m
5 , there cannot be more than one
exchange operating protably, even if the number of available trading technologies is
26Conditional on being alone in the market, this exchange would act as a monopolist.
30large. Furthermore, for  2 [2m
5 ; 10m
13 ], at most two exchanges can be protably formed,
even if more than two dierent trading technologies are available and if  is very
small. More generally, the result shows that a necessary condition27 for the formation
of at least n exchanges is > (n). The intuition is the same as for Proposition 3
(which is a special case with n = 1 and N = 2). When   (n), competition is
so strong between the exchanges with the highest qualities that they attract all the
listings. Thus, there is no room for another exchange to enter protably, by providing
the trading technology with quality (say) qn+1. Exchanges which are formed choose
dierent trading technologies because dierentiation is the only way to obtain strictly
positive prots and to recover entry costs (as in the previous proposition).
8 Conclusion.
This paper provides a model of competition for listings in which exchanges choose
their trading rules and listing fees. We nd that competition results in a variety of
trading rules in equilibrium. This variety is a way for exchanges to soften competi-
tion. The general point that a choice of trading technology allows rms to dierentiate
themselves and so soften price competition can apply to other screening rules pro-
mulgated by exchanges (e.g. minimum size requirements). Interestingly, the number
of exchanges that can be protably formed depends both on the size of the economy
and the number of dierent trading technologies. Further, the fact that trading rules
can soften price competition implies that exchanges may take decisions with respect
to trading rules that are not optimal for social welfare.
In our framework, we suggest that exchanges have some incentive to organize
themselves so that the proportion of the trading costs that they recover are small
(γ in our model). Credible ways to do this are to have a large minimum tick size,
or to organize themselves in such a way that third parties receive a benet from
trading volume. We also point that exchanges' objectives and thereby decisions in
our model would be dierent if they were controlled by issuers. These issues regarding
27This condition is not sucient, however. For instance, if the entry cost is very large, a small
number of exchanges will be formed, independently of the size of the economy () or the diversity
of trading technologies (N).
31the governance of exchanges are interesting venues for future research.
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34Table of Notation
t per share payo
 dispersion of rm's payos
m average per share payo
 entrepreneur's discount factor
N maximum number of shares
 proportion of shares retained by entrepreneur
s probability of liquidity shock for investor s
cL low trading cost







Fj Listing Fee of Exchange j
Vo l(t;qj) Expected trading volume of rm t listed on Exchange j
γ fraction of trading costs recovered by exchange
pIPO IPO price
pSEC price in the secondary market
V (s;t;cj) per share valuation of an investor of type s
U(;t;cj) utility benet of going public on Exchange j
q qH − qL, the quality dierence
F F1 − F2, the dierence in fees
a percentage dierence in execution costs q = a
cL
I total investors' surplus
E total entrepreneurs' surplus
 total social welfare
 Fixed entry cost
3510 Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The result is immediate from the discussion that precedes the lemma.2
Proof of Lemma 2.
Given t, an entrepreneur chooses the proportion he retains, , to maximize
U(;t;cj)=( 1− )N(1 − )t − (1 − )
2(Ncj);
which is concave in .  is obtained from the rst order condition of the en-
trepreneur's maximization problem (with qj =1 =cj). The IPO price is obtained
from Equation (6) and the maximal utility benet is obtained from Equation (8) (for
 = ).2
Proof of Lemma 3.
The expected trade size for an investor with type s in a given rm is s(Nds). The
marginal buyer in the IPO of a rm with type t has type (1−). It follows that the
investors holding shares of this rm in their portfolios are uniformly distributed on












Proof of Lemma 4.
Each part is obtained by dierentiating U((t;qj);t) (Equation (10)) with re-
spect to t and q.2
Proof of Proposition 1.
Immediate from arguments in the text.2
Proof of Lemma 5.
Consider an entrepreneur of type t who goes public. According to Equation (14),
this entrepreneur lists on Exchange 2 if:
N[q1 − q2]t2
16
 F1 − F2:
This inequality is binding for t(F1;F 2)=4
q
F
Nq.I f t >t , then rms smaller
than t prefer to list on Exchange 2 (if they go public). If t <tthen rms always
36prefer to list on Exchange 1.2
Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose that 1) is not true so that there is a pair of listing fees (F 
1;F
2) such that
only Exchange 2 attracts listings. Then F 
1 = F max
1 (F 
2). But consider the deviation
~ F1 = F min
1 (F 
2). Now Exchange 1 attracts all the listings and thus obtains a prot








2) cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that 2) is not true so that some rms do not go public on Exchange 1. As
the utility of going public is strictly positive, Exchange 2 can oer a positive listing
fee that attracts unlisted rms. This is a protable deviation of Exchange 2. Thus,
2) is true.
The last part of the lemma is a direct implication of the two rst parts.2
Proof of Proposition 2.:
We prove the proposition through a series of 3 lemmata. First, however, we
establish a condition for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist.
Lemma 8 : The condition γ  2(q)t(F 
1;F
2) is necessary for an equilibrium in
pure strategies to exist.
































 − t)]: (19)
If F 






37If this holds as an equality then F 
2 is an interior solution to Exchange 2's max-
imization problem and F 
2 = F int
2 . If the inequality is strict then F 
2 is a corner
solution to Exchange 2's maximization problem and F 
2 = F max
2 . These are the only
two possibilities (see Lemma 6).
When Exchange 2 increases its fee, its market share decreases thus the rst term
in bracket in Equation (19) is negative. Thus, a necessary condition for the previous
inequality to be satised is
@g(F
2 )
@F2  0. That is, the per listing prot must increase
with the listing fee (at least at the equilibrium listing fee for Exchange 2). When
γ>0, this may not be the case since the decrease in the number of listings translates









































@F2  0i 2 (  q)t(F 
1;F
2)  γ. This is the case if 2(q)t  γ
since t  t.2
Lemma 9 : In any equilibrium in which Exchange 2 does not attract any listings































Thus when F2 > −
Nγt














8 is necessary for Exchange 2 to have no other protable
choice than F max
2 (F 
















Lemma 10 : Recall that c  2m
5 .I f> c then both exchanges attract listings in
equilibrium.











; for F1  F
min
1 (F2) (22)











Note that F min
1 (F2)−F2 =
N(q)t2
































Consider an equilibrium in which Exchange 2 attracts no listings. In this case
the pair of equilibrium listing fees is (F 
1;F
2) with F 
1 = F min
1 (F 





























If > c, the R.H.S is strictly positive. This means that Exchange 1 is better
o raising its listing fee and F min
1 (F 
2) cannot be a best response. This implies that
(F min
1 ;Fmax
2 ) cannot be an equilibrium when > c.2
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rst show that > c is a necessary condition for Exchange 1 to choose a
cream skimming policy. In this case, the optimal listing fee, F 
1 for Exchange 1 is an




















This equation is equivalent to:






































The R.H.S of this equation is the per listing prot of Exchange 2 and must positive.
Therefore, using Equation (27), we conclude that:





which means that  t>3
2t. Since Exchange 1 is assumed to choose the cream skimming
policy, t >  t. Therefore the previous inequality requires  t>3
2t, which means > c.
It follows that when   c, there is no equilibrium in which Exchange 2 attracts some
40listings. Thus the equilibrium must be such that only Exchange 1 attracts listings.








N and F 
2 = −
Nγt
8 is an equilibrium in this
case.2
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let F 
2 be the fee of Exchange 2 in equilibrium. By choosing a fee equal to
F min
1 (F 
2), Exchange 1 attracts all the listings and thus obtains a prot which is




means that 1(F min
1 (F 
2);F
2) > 2(F 
1;F
2). Since 1(F 
1;F




we deduce that 1(F 
1;F
2) > 2(F 
1;F
2). This proves that H > L.
To prove that L > 0, consider (F 
1;F
2) an equilibrium in which the two exchanges
attract listings. This means that t >tand F 




























Now suppose that in equilibrium, Exchange 2 attracts some listings but obtains a
zero expected prot. This means that its per listing prot is zero, that is g(F 
2)=0 .









2q, which is not true, generically.
In particular, it cannot be satised if γ<2(q)t. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. Immediate from the arguments in the text. 2
Proof of Corollary 1.:
Let I be an indicator variable that is equal to 1 conditional on a rm listing on
Exchange 1. The proportion of shares sold to investors in the IPO of a rm with type
t that lists on Exchange j is (1 − (t;qj)) =
tqj
4 . Thus the expected proportion of
original shares sold to the public conditional on the IPO taking place on Exchange 1
is:
E((1 − 





41In the same way:
E((1 − 
(t;q2)) j I =0 )=
q2
4
E(t j t  t
):
As q1 >q 2, we obtain E((1 − (t;q1)) j I =1 )>E ((1 − (t;q2)) j I = 0).2
Proof of Corollary 2.
We use the indicator function dened in the previous corollary. The post IPO





(t;q1);t;c 1) j I =1 )>E (Np
IPO(
(t;q2);t;c 2) j I =0 ) ;
which proves the last part of the proposition. The IPO proceeds of a rm with type












;t;c 1) j I =1 )>E (N(1 − 
(t;q2))p
IPO(
;t;c 2) j I =1 ) ;
which proves the second part of the corollary.2
Proof of Corollary 3.
The demand for shares in the IPO is given in Lemma 1. Corollary 3 follows.2
Proof of Proposition 6.
If the two exchanges attract listings then t >t . This implies that listing fees
are interior solutions to the Exchange maximization problems. Thus, the listing fees
solve the rst order conditions for exchanges' maximization problems. Let F int
1 and
F int
2 be these solutions, respectively for Exchange 1 and 2. Consider the case in which
these fees are such that all the rms go public. The rst order condition for Exchange
1 is:

























42Subtracting Equation (30) from Equation (29), we get that:






















Using Equation (32) at the point (F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) and the denition of t, Equation
(31) yields:





which implies t = 4m
5 . Using this fact and Equation (15), we obtain that
(F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) must be such that:
q
(F int















We can then easily solve Equations (29) and (30) for F int
1 and F int
2 . These solutions
are as announced in the proposition. Note that since t = 4m
5 , it is possible to rewrite












Recall that U((t;q 2);t)=
q2Nt2

















Now, we need to establish that F int
1 and F int
2 dominate any other listing fees that
the two exchanges could choose. To do so, we establish that F int
1 and F int
2 are local
maxima. Then, we show that these local maxima are indeed global maxima.






























@2F1 = −(F1 − F2)− 3
2(Nq)− 1
2. Using Equation (32), algebra yields:
@21(F1;F 2)
@2F1




















Using the characterization of F int
1 and F int







1 is a local maximum. For a given F int
2 , Equation (29) is quadratic in F1.
Thus, this equation has another solution. But this solution is a local minimum since
F int
1 is a local maximum.28 We still have to check that there is no corner solution,
that is: 1(F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) > 1(F min
1 ;Fint
2 ) and that 1(F int
1 ;Fint






























The rst term in bracket is positive since   c. The second term in bracket can





0. Now 1(F min
1 ;Fint
2 ) > 2(F int
1 ;Fint
2 )  0. The rst inequality is straightforward
and the second is proved below when we show that F int
2 is a global maximum. This
implies 1(F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) > 0. With a listing fee equal to F max
1 , Exchange 1's market
share is zero which implies 1(F max
1 ;Fint
2 )=0 .T h u sF int
1 is preferred to F max
1 . This
proves that F int
1 is a global maximum or F int




2 ) had two local maxima in (Fmin
1 ;Fmax
1 ) then it would necessary have a local min-
imum in this interval as well. But this would imply that the rst order condition has 3 solutions,
which is impossible since this condition is a quadratic equation.
44For Exchange 2, we obtain:
@22(F1;F 2)
@2F2












@2F2 < 0, which proves that F int
2 is a local
maximum. Following the same reasoning as for Exchange 1, we can show that this
local maximum is unique. It remains to show that 2(F int
1 ;Fint





2 ) > 2(F int
1 ;Fmax
2 ). With F max
2 , Exchange 2 attracts no listings







16 (t + t)]. Thus, for
Exchange 2 to get a positive expected prot with a listing fee equal to F int







Using Equation (34) and the fact that t = 4m
5 , we nd that this inequality
is satised i γ<2(q)t, which is true (recall that we assume γ<2(q)t).
Hence, 2(F int
1 ;Fint
2 ) > 2(F int
1 ;Fmax
2 ). Under the same condition, it is also possible
to show that 2(F int
1 ;Fmin
2 ) < 0. It follows that 2(F int
1 ;Fint




2 is a global maximum or F int
2 = F r
2(F int
1 ).2
Proof of Corollary 4.
Listing fees in Proposition 6 are linear functions of the quality dierential, (q).
The slopes of these functions are b1() and b
0
1(). They are positive if   c.2
Proof of Corollary 5.
Immediate using the closed form solutions of the listing fees given in Proposition
6. 2
Proof of Corollary 6.
Listing fees in Proposition 6 are linear functions of γ. The slopes of these functions
are negative.2
Proof of Lemma 7.
If exchanges have dierent trading technologies, then, the total surplus to en-
trepreneurs, E(q1;q 2) is just the excess of their utility from going public over the













45An investor of type s who buys into an IPO gets a benet, per share, of the
dierence between her valuation and the IPO price, or [t−scj]−[t−(1−)cj]. So,





















where expectations are taken over investors who buy into the IPOs and over rm
types. Recall that (1−(t;qj)) =
tqj
4 and that the expected trading volume of a rm
with type t listed on Exchange j is : Vo l(t;qj)=
Ntqj
8 . It follows that:
Z (1−)
0

























The total expected surplus is:
=
I(q1;q 2)+
E(q1;q 2)+ 1 + 2
Since γ = 1, listing fees and trading costs are transfers from investors and rms






















Finally using the fact that U((t;qj);t)=
Nt2qj
16 , we obtain:
(q1;q 2)=
"
 t2 − t2
8
+








Proof of Proposition 7
The total expected surplus, , decreases with q. Hence welfare is maximized for
q =0 . 2
Proof of Corollary 7.
46When > c, exchanges optimally choose dierent trading technologies. Thus
q>0 and welfare is not maximized.2
Proof of Proposition 8.
Suppose rst that the two exchanges have dierent trading technologies and as-
sume that Exchange 2's listing fee is F 
2. Let ETVo l(qj) be the total expected trading



















Nq g. Clearly, Exchange 1 maximizes its expected trading
volume by choosing its fee so that tc = t. Now consider the following listing policy





8 ] and F 
2 = −
Nγm
8 . Note that
t(F 
1;F
2)=t. The smallest fee that Exchange 2 can charge without losing money
is F 
2 given the fee of Exchange 1. Thus F 
2 is a best response for Exchange 2.
Furthermore 1(F 
1;F
2) is strictly positive. Therefore F 
1 is a solution of the previous
maximization program and (F 
1;F
2) is an equilibrium. The expected trading volume
in the two exchanges in this case are respectively:
E
TVo l(q1)) =





If the two exchanges choose the same trading technology, they compete  al a
Bertrand. The equilibrium outcome is identical to the Nash equilibrium described in
Proposition 1 and each exchange attracts half of the listings. In this case the expected
trading volume of each exchange is:
E
TVo l(q)=
Nq( t2 − t2)
32
;
where q is the quality of the trading technology chosen by both exchanges.
Now consider the stage (date 1) in which exchanges choose their trading technology
with a view at maximizing their expected trading volume. The following table gives
the expected trading volume of each exchange according to their trading technology


















As q1 >q 2, it is a strictly dominant strategy for an exchange to choose the low
trading cost technology.2
Proof of Proposition 9.
First suppose that the two exchanges have dierent size requirements. We rst
derive the optimal reaction of Exchange 2 to the listing fee F 
1 chosen by Exchange 1.
Let Fm(t;t T) be the listing fee that is charged by an exchange which is a monopolist
over a population of entrepreneurs with types in [t;t T]. Suppose that the listing fee
of Exchange 1 is lower than Fm(t;t T). Exchange 2 can choose between two strategies.
First it can undercut slightly Exchange 1. In this way it captures all the listings since
the two exchanges have the same trading technology. It obtains a prot equal to:
F1 +
γN( t + t)
16
:
Alternatively Exchange 2 can exploit its monopoly power on the entrepreneurs
w i t hat y p ei n[ t;t T] since these entrepreneurs are not eligible to list on Exchange 1.
In this case, it charges a fee F 












where tm 2 [t;t T] is the type of the entrepreneur who is just indierent between
listing on Exchange 2 or not going public. In order to be active Exchange 1 must
choose its listing fee so that Exchange 2 is better o charging a fee equal to Fm(t;t T).






γN(t +  t)
16
:
48Clearly Exchange 2 gets a strictly positive expected prot since Fm(t;t T) 
Nt2q2
16 .
Note that F 
1 <F m(t;t T) as it was assumed initially since:
F

1 − Fm(t;t T)=





m) − ( t2 − t2)]
16
< 0
Exchange 1 's expected prot is
1 =








( t + tT)

:




−γN( t + tT)
16
:







which is satised since m
2 > 0. This proves Part 1 of the lemma. If the two
exchanges have the same minimum size requirement, the exchange with the lowest
listing fee get all the listings. It is then direct that fees are chosen such that it cannot
be optimal for the exchange that moves in second to undercut the rst exchange.
The only fee with this property is such that both exchanges get zero expected prots,
which proves the second part.2
Proof of Proposition 10.
Immediate from the arguments in the text.2
Proof of Proposition 11.
From Proposition 1, if two exchanges enter and choose the same trading technology
then prots are zero. Hence for >0, entry of two exchanges can be optimal only if
subsequently they choose dierent trading technologies and attract listings.
Suppose   c. If two exchanges enter and dierentiate, only one attracts all
the listings (Proposition 3). Therefore only one exchange can be formed. For >0,
suciently low, entry for a single exchange is protable since it acts as a monopolist.
Suppose > c. From Proposition 4 if two exchanges enter and dierentiate,
they capture strictly positive prots. Hence, there exists an >0 suciently low, so
that entry is protable. Suppose that a third exchange enters. If it chooses a trading
49technology with qj, j =1 ;2, the two exchanges with this quality Bertrand compete
and make zero prots. Thus a third exchange cannot be formed protably. 2
Proof of Proposition 12.
In this proof Exchange j is the exchange with quality level j. Suppose that
there exists an equilibrium in which n  2 exchanges are formed. Two exchanges
with the same trading technology Bertrand compete and obtain zero prots. Thus,
the exchanges which enter later must choose dierent trading technologies in order
to recover the entry cost. It is immediate that these exchanges must choose the
trading technologies with the n rst qualities: fq1, q2,...,qng. Otherwise an additional
exchange could be formed protably by choosing the trading technology which is not
provided in the set fq1, q2,...,qng.
Now, we prove that a necessary condition for the n exchanges which enter to obtain
strictly positive expected prots,is that > (n). Let F  =( F 
1;:::;F 
n) be the vector
of listing fees chosen by Exchanges 1;2;:::;n. Let t
j be the entrepreneur who is just
indierent between listing on Exchange j or on Exchange j + 1, for j 2 [1;n− 1].







for j 2 [1;n− 1]:














If the n exchanges obtain strictly positive expected prots then F 
j is an interior
solution of Exchange j's maximization problem. Therefore it is solution of Exchange














































@Fj > 0 and that
@tj−1








The R.H.S of this inequality is the per listing prot of Exchange j and therefore
must be positive. Therefore the term in bracket in Equation (38) is negative. It
follows that Equation (38) holds i:
(tj−1 − tj) −
@tj
@Fj












tj 1 <j n − 1 (40)
Using the same reasoning, it can be checked that this inequality also holds for
j = 1 (that is  t>3
2t1). Furthermore, note that tn−1 >tif n exchanges are formed.
Therefore, using a recursive argument, we deduce from Equation (40) that if n ex-
changes are formed protably (attracts listings) then:
 t>(3=2)
(n−1)t
Using the fact that  t = m + 
2 and t = m − 
2, this inequality turns out to be
equivalent to > (n). This means that if   (n), there cannot be an equilibrium
in which more than n exchanges are formed and obtain strictly positive expected
prots. Therefore at most (n − 1) exchanges are formed if   (n).2
51Figure 1: Timing of the Model










to list (ii) the issue











Demand for Shares in the IPO
t Cj = 0
Cj > 0
Cj' > Cj
0
1 (1-a)